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SUMMARY
This is a report of the results to date of a project concerned
with the financing of primary and secondary education in the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts. The central concern is the illustration of those as-
pects of the current system and proposals which have a bearing on the
accomplishment of stated objectives. In particular, the objective with
which we are most concerned is that of equalization between school dis-
tricts of average school expenditures per child within school districts.
The project has identified a number of problems with the existing system
of state aid and with some of its central assumptions. In order to over-
come these difficulties and develop a better system, a number of new
areas of study are proposed.
The present NESDEC state aid formula, initially implemented in
1966, sought to equalize potential expenditure per child. Current state
aid proposals are mainly modifications of the formula approach. This
study examines possible future effects of old and new formulas by per-
forming simulations based on actual Chapter 70 data for the 351 school
districts in Massachusetts. The simulations follow the effects of the
formulas over a 7 year period into the future. In addition, mathematical
analyses are also performed to highlight certain critical variables.
The general conclusion is that the existing system and current
new proposals give very similar results with respect to equalization of
expenditures. Their main differences lie in the share of the educational
expenditures covered by the State. In terms of actual expenditures per
child in the school districts, neither the historical development, nor
1
Potential expenditure equalization is an equalization when all
school districts are giving the same local effort in terms of a uniform
local school tax rate on property.
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our simulation results concerning future developments, are encouraging.
The general incentive character of the NESDEC formula does not solve the
problem of equalization. It is generally considered that the incentive
effect is lost on the poor districts, and is effective primarily in the
rich districts, thereby increasing inequality.
Detailed analysis of the various effects which contribute to the
performance (or non-performance) of the equalization aid formula include
the following:
(1) The constraints in the formula work against equalization
(discussed in section 3.1).
(2) The formula uses both the total school population and the
public school population instead of the latter exclusively.
This leads to distortions in equalization due to variations
in the ratio of the two figures (as discussed in section 3.2).
(3) The potential equalization is valid only at a unique uniform
local tax rate in the state, given a level of funding and
a set of formula parameters (as discussed in sections 3.3 and
3.4).
The third point above is the most important. It implies that a
funded formula-based-system is not a general potential equalizer, but
equalizes only under a very specific condition. It also implies that a
decision about level of funding is in reality a decision about what
should be the expenditure per pupil in the Commonwealth. It follows that
in most cases an underfunded formula is disequalizing.
The Serano and subsequent court decisions seem to give a clear
indication of what the objective of an equalization program should be.
The decision emphasizes the rights of the child, rather the prerogatives
of any arbitrary governmental unit. Governmental units have the responsi-
bility to guarantee the rights of the child. Therefore, equalization of
potential expenditures (as has been emphasized thus far in the formula

approach) is far less important than a greater equalization of actual
expenditures.
It follows that attention must be focused on financial decision
making at the local level. Any new proposal must consider the issue of
local versus central control. Furthermore, it will be important to
determine the impact of local control not only on financing but, insofar
as possible, on other issues such as the quality of education.
The conclusion of the study is that new alternatives for
achieving equalization should be created and analyzed. Equalization is a
complex problem involvina a number of interrelated issues that must be
considered. Important issues are:
1. The method of raising funds.
2. The method of distributing funds.
3. The ability of the school districts to absorb additional funds
effectively.
4. The dynamics of the school population and tax base.
. 5. Changes in educational costs.
6. The burden of other municipal services.
These questions become involved with organizational issues such as:
1. The size of school districts.
2. The balance of control between state and local district and
within the district.
3. School desegregation.
The M.I.T team feels that a computer-assisted modeling approach
using an appropriate Massachusetts data base can make a significant con-
tribution to the analysis of existing and new alternatives for achieving
equalization.
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1 . Public School Funding: Components and Problems
The educational system in Massachusetts is supported by three
major sources of revenue: local taxes, federal grants, and state grants.
The effect of each on the level of school spending varies throughout
the 351 cities and towns. One reason is that the local school tax rate
on property is set by the city or town, determined independently of
any external norm. The federal government dispenses grants for particular
educational purposes: aid to depressed areas, aid to minority children,
purchase of special educational materials, etc. Although this "categorical"
aid is generally distributed with the advice of the state Department of
Education, a good portion of federal aid goes to towns which either have
a large number of military personnel or which are "poverty" areas. Simi-
larly, the state has a number of categorical aid programs of its own, the
most notable being the School Building Program. Here, there are often
proportional matching funds constraints so that the money often goes
where it is already abundant.
As can be seen form the above discussion, the funding system
as so far described, provides many opportunities for an unequal distribu-
tion of funds per school child. The Commonwealth realized this and in
1966 established an "equalization" aid program. Through this vehicle the
state attempts to equalize the ability of school districts to provide
quality education despite differences in the relative wealth of their
inhabitants. The basis for determination of aid is the relative property
valuation per school child in a particular city to the state average
property valuation per school child. It can readily be seen why this basis is
used when one realizes that most local taxes are real estate taxes. In
order to support a school expenditure of some number of dollars per child,
the town must set a tax rate such that, when applied to its local pro-
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perty valuation, will provide sufficient funds (in addition to possible
grant revenue) to pay for the schools. Because property valuation per
school attending child varies by some 300% across the state, we would
expect corresponding tax rate variations if all localities spent the
same amount per child. Since this would result in the poorest towns
paying the highest tax rate, we find school quality (as measured by
expenditures) often being sacrificed to obtain a lower tax burden. This
then is the combined problem that state equalization aid, as determined
by the NESDEC formula, was designed to solve: provide sufficient aid in
proportion to each city or town's equalized property valuation such that
there would be an equal expenditure on the schools per child at an equal
tax rate. In order to show more exactly how the NESDEC formula attempted
to solve these problems, the following paragraphs will describe the de-
tails of the formula. (See Appendix D for the exact format of the formula.)
The formula is based on the cssumption that those cities and
towns which can least afford to pay for schools should be given a greater
share of the state funds available. The Massachusetts formula equaliza-
tion aid is distributed as a percentage of the expenditures of the school
district that are not supported by otr.er state or federal grants. These
expenditures are known as "reimbursable expenditures" and generally account
for some 80% of the total school system's costs (although there is some
variation across the state). The percentage paid back is based on two
factors: the first is the relative percentage of an area's equalized pro-
perty valuation to the state average. This is then multiplied by the
fractional amount that the state wished to reimburse on the average. This
"average coverage" figure is currently 35% although some have proposed that
it be raised to 50%. In order to ensure at least some reimbursement to
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wealthy towns and some expenditure by poor towns, the somewhat arbitrary
limits on the percentage actually reimbursed have been set at 15 and 75%.
(Recent proposals have also suggested varying these figures.) Therefore,
the net effect of the current Massachusetts Equalization Aid Formula is
that a town whose equalized property valuation per school attending
child is equal to the state average would receive aid of 35% of its
reimbursable expenditures. The town whose property valuation is 38% or
less of the state's average will receive 75% while a town whose valuation
is 131% or more than the average will receive 15%. (Additional limitations
are imposed on reimbursable expenditures so that the base upon which the
percentage aid is applied is between 85 to 110% of the state average).
The formula described above was implemented by legislation in 1965,
It was felt at that time that the formula would, in fact, bring about a
substantial equalization of school expenditures per child throughout the
state. However, this has not proved to be the case. According to the
latest figures available (1971) not only is there a 200% range in school
tax rate but an even more astonding 250% difference in school expenditures
per child. If the goal remains to equalize expenditures, several courses
of action are now open to the legislature. These options vary from a
complete takeover of school funding at a state level to the enactment of
school legislation aimed at establishing state standards to the simpler
but perhaps less effective, design of modifications to the existing
formula-based approach. While interest has certainly been expressed in
designing an entirely new system of financing, (in some cases involving
a state property tax replacing local property taxes) there has been a
considerable effort placed on the more politically tractable idea of
modification to the NESDEC formula. Two bills have already been submitted
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to the legislature regarding such modifications and more are expected.
Since a good deal of the simulation experiments was designed to show
the effects of these and other proposed modifications, the two bills will
be described below.
State equalization aid is provided for in paragraph D of
Section 2 of Chapter 70 of the General Laws of the Conmonwealth. This
was inserted in 1966. The two bills before the legislature, therefore,
deal with changes to this Section. The first, an act "providing for
corrective changes in the school aid formula" was submitted by
Charlotte Ryan, Chairman of the Massachusetts Educational Conference Board
(Senate bill 985, denoted "Ryan Bill" in this paper). The essence of the
bill is as follows:
1. Change the 35% average coverage to 50% in three equal
steps over the next three years (i.e., the average
coverage constant should be .6 in 1973, .55 in 1974,
and .5 in 1975).
2. The minimum aid as a percentage of reimbursable
expenditures is reduced from 15% to 10%.
3. The stipulation that reimbursable expenditures are
adjusted to fall between 80% and 110% of the state
average is removed, and, therefore, the actual reim-
bursable expenditures are used in computing aid.
The second bill (Senate bill 958, denoted "Thistle Bill" in this
paper) was entitled "an act to equalize fiscal ability for support of s
2
schools and other municipal services.
In addition to a number of provisions about the calculations of equalized
property value, it provides for the establishment of a 4% sales tax such
that 25% of the receipts from this tax shall be credited to a "Local Aid
Fund". In addition, a number of changes are made to the dispersement of
K
An error that was drawn to our attention subsequent to the writ-
ing of this paper, bill 958 should be correctly termed the "Cauley Bill"
as the bill was introduced by Senator Cauley.

categorical grants and the following changes are made to paragraph D
of Section 2 of Chapter 70:
1. The average coverage is changed to 40% immediately
(the average coverage constant in the formula be-
comes .6).
2. The minimum amount reimbursed is changed form 15%
to 10%.
3. "No city or town shall be eligible for school aid
which has made reimbursable expenditures per child
in net average membership less than the smaller of
(a) 90% of the average reimbursable expenditure
per child for the entire state or (b) an amount equal
to its reimbursable expenditures per child in the
second proceeding fiscal year increased by 5% and
further increased by the percent of increase of the
average reimbursable expenditure per child for the
entire state...". That is, the cities and towns
would be required to spend a certain amount of
money in order to be eligible for aid (as opposed to
the existing situation where if a city spends less
than 80% of the average, that number is inserted in
the formula rather than the true amount -- there is
no requirement on the city to spend any particular
amount).
As will be seen in the following sections, the essence of these
two bills (as well as several other suggestions) was simulated in the
computer runs.
It can be seen from the above that a number of experts in the
field of education and financing feel that significant steps towards
equalization of school expenditure can be accomplished by varying one or
more parameters of the NESDEC formula. The remainder of this paper will
deal with our analyses by making use of computer simulation as well as
3
One aspect of the Thistle Bill that we have not evaluated is
the third change listed, setting requirements for a town to be eligible
to aid in terms of a minumum level of expenditure. The major reason for
not evaluating this aspect of the bill is that we feel unable to predict
the response of school districts to such a requirement. This is an issue
that should be addressed in eventual follow-up studies.

analytical mathematical manipulations. We have attempted to highlight
a number of the basic characteristics of this approach and also the
consequences of the proposed actions. We will begin by discussing the
results of the computer simulation.
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2. The Model
A model is a description of a system whose structure or behavior
is sufficiently analogous so that it can be used for learning about the
system in an economical manner. The purpose of a simulation study is to
allow the researcher to gather data on the behavior of a real world system
by reference to the behavior of a model of that system. In our case, the
system being studied was that encompassing the allocation and expendi-
ture of Chapter 70 School funds and its effect upon tax rate on the cities
and towns. Because of the large factor that these funds represent in the
total educational finance system, it was felt that most questions rele-
vant to the problem of equalization of expenditure and tax rate could be
addressed without bringing in the complications of state and federal
categorical aid programs. The model that was designed used the NESDEC
formula to represent the allocation process (this part of the model, there-
fore, is exactly the same as the real world system) and several different
assumptions about the behavior of various local itites in spending money
and determining tax rates to represent the expenditure process. While
a number of issues were addressed using the simulation process others
were studied by mathematical analysis. For example, we could quite easily
show the effect over a period of time of changing the various limits of
the formula by use of simulation. In order to get an understanding, however,
of the general effect of differences in the proportion of children in public
and private schools, mathematical analysis was used. In general, where dif-
ferences between school districts were to be studied, (in expenditures
tax rate, etc.), simulation was used. Where general properties were of in-
terest (relationships between the various factors in the formula), mathe-
matical analysis was used. The following sections of the paper will address
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each of these and their results in considerable detail.
One of the important parts of the model building process is
deciding where to draw the boundary between the system under study and
the rest of the world. Clearly, at a certain level everything is re-
lated to everything else. Boundaries should be drawn in such a way so
that all factors influencing the system that have a bearing on the ob-
jectives of the study are included. For example, it is certainly true
that changes in population or equalized property valuation effect the
amount of money that a school district must raise for schools and effect
the base upon which it can draw for these funds. It was decided, how-
ever, that since these items change fairly slowly in time (especially
when percentage differences betweeen towns are considered) they would
only serve to complicate our study. On the other hand, the fact that
the legislature often finds less total funds to distribute than appli-
cation of the formula would require, seems to be a relevant factor.
Thus, "underfunding" is discussed with an analytical treatment later in
this paper. Our consultations with researchers in the field led us to
believe that omitted factors were either of an unimportant nature or
had predictable and regular effect.
The simulation study began with a computer-based implementation
of the expenditure-funding cycle. The program was written in the
EXPRESS language and is included in Appendix B, It is not necessary,
however, to study the computer program in order to follow the analysis.
If reference is made to Fig. 2.1 on the following page, it will be seen
that there are two major aspects of the model: first, is local decision
making in terms of the school budget and the use of reimbursed expendi-
tures; second is the computation of state aid using the formula. It can
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Figure 2.1
The School District Financing Model
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be seen that state aid funds can go either directly into school expendi-
tures or can enter into the decision making process and lower the tax
rate. The decision making process determines the tax rate which can be
seen to determine locally available school funds. These funds (combined
with the state aid funds) become the "reimbursable expenditures" which
feed back in to the next year's computation of the state aid formula.
The various data items input to and output from the model will now be
enumerated.
The output of our simulation runs is a listing of state aid
percentage, state aid, and school expenditures for each city and town
over a period of seven years. Various statistics, such as mean and stan-
dard deviations were also computed. The input data consisted of the latest
figures on equalized property valuation, number of school attending child-
ren, net average membership in the public schools, and current year
reimbursable expenditures. These were taken from the report of 1971,
Chapter 70, Equalization Aid prepared by the Division of Research of the
Department of Education. Various parameters were input to each run of
the model to simulate some proposed or possible modification of the
formula. These decision variables were the average coverage percentage,
the minimum and maximum aid percentage, and the floor and ceiling on re-
imbursable expenditures, if any. These parameters, when taken together with
the local decision making behavioral assumptions, controlled the operation
of the system.
Modeling the behavior of local decision makers could have been
approached in a number of different ways. One approach would have been to
gather interview data on how each locality used the different proposals
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and how they would act in any particular case. It seemed, however, that
a simpller approach might be considered because of the general propen-
sity of a locality to act between two possible extremes. After it is
determined how much money a school district is to receive, it is up to
the individual district as to whether the money is immediately used to
increase school expenditures, whether is is used to decrease the amount
that local residents must provide via the property tax. or somewhere in
between. We, therefore, decided to make several different assumptions
of local decision making based on these two basic behavior patterns and
to compare the effect caused by each. They can be expressed as follows:
1. All school districts preserve their existing local tax
effort and use all additional state funds to increase total
expenditures on schools. That is, total expenditures equal
the local contribution plus the state aid. (This assumption
is labeled "constant local effort",)
2. All school districts preserve their existing total expendi-
tures per child and use all additional state funds to reduce
their local school tax rate. (This is labeled "constant
total effort".)
By setting an additional parameter in the model, we could vary
behavior between these two extremes.
For the purposes of investigating certain statements about equal-
ization of expenditures when all school districts have decided upon an
equal tax rate , we allowed a third alternative known as "uniform local
effort". In this behavior mode, the tax rate was set uniformly across the
state (possibly because of legislation forcing localities to do so) and
state aid funds could not be used to change it. (This is different from
the first behavioral assumption because all districts begin with an equal
rate.) In this way we could test the potential quality of the different
proposal for equalizing school expenditure under the best conditions.
2
This "behavior mode" was suggested by Mrs. Charlotte Ryan. As
can be seen, some of the major findings in the report relate to this
concept. We are grateful for having our attention drawn to this real
issue.
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Our modeling efforts to date tested the various behavioral
assumptions but with all districts operating under the same assumption
at any one time. It could be argued, and we would willingly agree that,
it can not be assumed that behavior will be identical for all districts.
One of our proposals for further study is concerned with this problem
and, in general, with the more accurate determination of local decision
making variables. This issue will not be dealt with further at this time.
The next section will discuss the various results of simulation
runs performed with different values of the parameters mentioned above.
Such changes in parameters can easily be performed on-line during the
actual run and, in fact, this was done during several demonstrations. We
found it extremely important to be able to achieve this flexibility
in model design so that our analyses of proposed state aid formulas could
be immediately available. One of our future aims would be to instruct the
authors of legislation in the direct use of the system so that they too
might be able to test out formula changes before actually proposing them.
This, however, remains for the future.
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3. Results
Having reviewed the development of the model of school funding,
we will present here the results of the model manipulations. We start
by reviewing the results of our initial computer based simulations. There-
after, we will present the results of an analytical treatment of the model
with some simulation runs that we performed to test the latter results. The
last two sections deal with an anlytical treatment of the question of
underfunding of a formula based system, and with the analytical treatment
of an issue that we have termed "the mirage of equal potential". As the
title indicates, this last section suggests that potential equalization
is a property of the formula based approach that disappears when one gets
close up!
3.1 Initial Simulation Runs
The complete summary of the results of the initial simulation
runs are tabulated in the first six tables of Appendix C. Before reviewing
the results, let us briefly present the different variables that we
obtained as output from the simulation runs.
Each output variable is tabulated for the seven years (1971 to
1977) simulated, with one value for each year. Within each year, we computed
the value of the following variables:
1. The mean and standard deviation of the reimbursable expendi-
tures per net average number of public school attending child-
ren. These values are computed on a public school child basis,
and not on the basis of school districts. I.e., it is the
mean and standard deviation on a school district basis,
weighted by the net average membership of each district. (If
we use values that are not weighted in the sense above, the
dispersion in expenditures per pupil increases enourmously).
2. The mean and standard deviation of the local school tax
rate on a school district basis.

17-
3. The total amount of dollars required from the state to
fund the programs.
4. A histogram representing the number of school districts
within each of 20 reimbursable expenditure per net average
membership ranges from $400 or less, to $2200 or more, in
steps of $100. This gives a frequency distribution of the
expenditures in the Commonwealth for any particular year.
Each simulation run always starts with the same data in the first year,
which is the most recent school district data available (from the Report
of Chapter 70 State Aid Expenditures in Massachusetts in 1971 (published
January 1972))
Table 3.1 summarizes the different parameter settings for the runs
made. The parameter setting determines which program is being simulated
and which local behavior model is being used. In all we made six runs
initially, consisting of two behavioral models for each of the three pro-
grams studied. We do not report results of a third behavioral model de-
scribed above, "constant total effort", as this model will not by defini-
tion result in any equalization of expenditure patterns.
Let us now turn to the results. They can best be reviewed by look-
ing at a graphical representation. Figure 3.1 represents the development
of the mean reimbursable expenditure per net average membership and the
standard deviation of the same for the three programs, under the condition
of "constant local effort". We find that there are three aspects that should
be noticed:
1. All the programs have an upward sloping curve with time that
tapers off after 3-4 years.
2. In terms of the standard deviation of expenditures, which can
be considered a measure of equality of expenditures, the
programs do not differ markedly.
3. The main difference between the programs is in the difference
in the mean reimbursable expenditure per net average
membership. The results in Appendix B concerning the total
amount of funds required from the state, indicate how this
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difference in mean expenditure is arrived at: by an increase
in the level of funding by the state.
We feel it appropriate to underline that the results discussed
above were obtained by assuming constant local effort. Figure 3.2 gives
the presentation of the same results as Figure 3.1 for the case of uniform
local effort (at $2.25 per $100 of equalized property value). These
results should indicate how well the different programs achieve potential
equalization.
The results indicate that there is no difference in the equali-
zation of expenditures (as measured by the standard deviation) comparing
the case of uniform local effort to the case of constant local effort. In
actual fact, the standard deviation has increased slightly, with slightly
lower mean expenditure. Looking at some of the histograms obtained, the
issue is illuminated.
Figure 3.3 A and B give the f]istograms for run 6 (ref. table 3.1)
respectively for the year 1971 and 1975 (the dotted line indicates the
mean expenditure per net average membership). Figure 3.3A represents the
distribution of the actual expenditures in 1971. Although the distribution
is somewhat skewed, the mean and the median seem to be almost identical.
However, in the case of Figure 3.3 B, which is the equal potential pic-
ture simulated for 1975, the distribution is vastly more skewed. At first
sight, this result is not surprising. One would suspect that the constraints
on the fraction of expenditures reimbursed in the program would give
approximately such an effect. However, this does not explain the skewness
of the distribution locally around the mean. Potential equalization should
clearly result in a very tight distribution around the mean.
The fact that our simulations did not give the hypothesized effects
with respect to potential equalization, led us to initially suspect that
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there was a "bug" in our computer model. However a meticulous analysis
of the model did not uncover any bugs, and we therefore were led to
hypothesize that there was an unknown structural property of the formula
system that led to the results observed. This led subsequently to an
analytical treatment of the model that did uncover a property whose
effect in terms of potential equalization had not been recognized pre-
viously. We have termed it the NAM/SAC effect.
3.2 Identification and Analysis of the NAM/SAC Effect
In an attempt to identify the cause of the lack of potential
equalization in the formula based programs, we developed an expression
of the reimbursable expenditures (REEXP) per net average number of
public school attending children (NAM) for a single school district. The
basic assumption that enabled us to derive an expression for the REEXP
per NAM was that the district had reached an equilibrium REEXP/NAM where
it was receiving the exact amount of state aid corresponding to its school
tax rate (TAXRATE) and equalized property valuation (EQPVAL), The analyti-
cal treatment is presented in detail in Appendix d- Here we will solely
discuss the main result, which was the following expression:
REEXP, TAXRATE g EQPVAL . SAC
^NAM ~ AVGCOV ' ^SAT NM
The additional variables are the number of school attending children in
the district (SAC), and the average fraction of expenditures to be covered
locally (AVGCOV).
From the formula we observe that REEXP/NAM is not a function of
local wealth. However, it is the function of the ratio of the total school
population of the district to the net average membership. This ratio
varies over the state for different school districts, and would therefore
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seem to account for some of the dispersion in REEXP/NAM observed when
a uniform local tax rate is assumed. The ratio is introduced by the
use of the EQPVAL per SAC figure in the formula when computing the
fraction of expenditures that the state is to reimburse.
The hypothesis above was tested by changing the formula in the
simulation model to a formula that solely used the NAM figure. Three
runs were made to test the effects of this last change on the potential
equalization capability of the three programs considered. Table 3.2
summarizes the parameters for the three runs. Figure 3.4, a histogram
representing 1975 conditions in run 8, clearly shows the hypothesized
effect of the formula change. The expenditure per pupil distribution is
now much more clustered around the mean. The effect becomes even more
noticeable after two more years (ref. the full listing of the results in
Appendix C).
Figure 3.5 gives an indication of the effect on the mean and
standard deviation of REEXP/NAM by the change. The main point here is
probably to notice that the change only results in a 10% reduction of
the standard deviation. The remaining dispersion is due to the con-
straints on the fraction of REEXP/NAM to be reimbursed. The effect is
identical for all three programs.
The equation above shows a property of the formula approach
that our first simulation runs indicated: a change in the average
fraction of the expenditures covered does not change the potential
equalization properties of the program.
3.3 The Effect of Underfunding the Formula
We here report an analytical treatment of the question: is it
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5
equalizing or disequalizing to underfund a formula, as opposed to changing
the formula so that it is fully funded? (This when the scarce funds are
allocated on an equal percentage basis to all districts-)
We show that in the case of actual expenditures, it is difficult
to give a general answer to this question. However, we argue that with
the exisitng expenditure pattern in the state, it is highly disequalizing
to underfund the formula. In terms of potential equalization, we clearly
show that underfunding reduces the equalization effect of the formula
approach.
The effect of underfunding is studied by looking at the change
in state aid a school district receives as the result of going from a
fully funded formula to a partially funded formula. We assume, for sim-
plicity, that the total reimbursable expenditure of the school district,
REEXP, remains the same. The ratio of its equalized property value
per school attending child to the state average, RATIO, stays constant.
The effect of underfunding results from going from a fully funded formula
with an average local effort coefficient, AVGCOV-. , that results in a
state aid, STAID,, to a formula with a lower average local effort coeffi-
cient, AVGCOV2 (AVGC0V2< AVGCOV-,), that results in a state aid, STAID2,
that is only a fraction P of the state aid implied by RATIO, AVGCOV2 and
REEXP. The change in state aid, Zi STAID, is determined as follows:
(1) STAID^/NAM = (1 -AVGCOV^ ' RATIO) ' REEXP/NAM
(2) STAID2/NAM = P • (1 - AVGCOV2 • RATIO) • REEXP/NAM
from (1 ) and (2) we have
(3) A STAID/NAM = STAID2/NAM - STAID.,/NAM
= ( [AVGCOV^ - P • AVGCOV2] • RATIO - [1-P])'REEXPR/NAM
I.e., that the legislature appropriates only a fraction of the
funds due to the school districts as derived by the formula and their
expenditures.
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Assuming that all districts have an equal reimbursable expenditure
per child, REEXP, we can determine ^ STAID as a function of RATIO, a
measure of local wealth per school attending child. The functional re-
lationship is represented graphically in Figure 3.6.
In order that underfunding has no effect,A STAID should be zero
for all districts, i.e., for all values of RATIO. The actual relation-
ship is a monotone increasing curve with the value of RATIO, i.e., the
effect of underfunding the formula benefits the wealthier districts at
the expense of the poorer districts.
Looking at the actual expenditure pattern in Massachusetts, we
note that with respect to the discussion above, the assumption of equal
reimbursable expenditure per school child is not valid. We note, however,
that the change in state aid in equation (3) is directly a function of the
reimbursable expenditure per NAM: with larger REEXP per NAM, the larger
A STAID, all other things equal. Given that the wealthier districts tend
to have higher REEXP/NAM in the case of actual expenditures in Massachu-
setts, the underfunding will have a compounded effect of both the RATIO
value and of the high REEXP/NAM. The result is even greater disequalization
than in the case of potential equalization.
3.4 The Mirage of Equal Potential
The analysis of the effect of underfunding the formula, directed
our attention to the question of what is a fully funded formula. Our dis-
cussion assumes that we have rid the formula of the disequalizing effects
of constraints and of the use of SAC figures.
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i ASTAID/NAM
RATIO
ASTAID/NAMj^^^^Q
^^^° STAID/NAM-0 ' a-P)/(AVGCOV^ - AVGCOV^*?)
ASTAID/NAMj^^jQ^Q - (1-P)*REEXP/NAM
Figure 3.6 The effect of formula underfunding on the stateaid
received by a school district in terms of change in
stateaid (ASTAID). The school districts are represented by
the ratio of their equalized property value per SAC to the
average for the Commonwealth (RATIO).
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We show that given a decision on the average coverage coefficient
in the formula (e.g., 35% in the existing NESDEC formula), and on the
level of funding of the program, the legislature has made an implicit
decision on the uniform local tax rate and uniform reimbursable expendi-
ture per public school attending child at which there is full equality
in the Commonwealth. At any other uniform local tax rate, the formula
is either underfunded or overfunded. The implication of this observa-
tion is that a funded formula does result in equalization solely if all
school districts decide to operate with a school tax rate at a specific
uniform value. A funded formula is not a general potential equalizer,
but equalizes only under a very specific condition. It also implies
that a decision about funding is in reality a decision about what
should be the expenditure per pupil in the Commonwealth.
To show the above assertion, it is only necessary to observe
that the total state aid required to fund the formula is a linear function
of the school tax rate of the individual school districts. With the total
funds available determined, there is therefore a unique uniform local
tax rate that satisfies the relationship. In more analytical terms, we
have for district i
(1) STAID. = A. • TAXRATE. and (2) REEXP. = B ' TAXRATE.
The sum of the state aid for each individual district should equal the
funds available, FUNDS, i.e.,
(3) FUNDS = 2. STAID.
If the districts have a uniform and equal local school tax rate, TAXRATE, i.e.
(4) TAXRATE. = TAXRATE for all i = 1 ,2,3,. . . ,351
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we have
(5) FUNDS ='^ STAID. = ^ A . ' TAXRATE. = TAXRATE "^A
i.e.,
(6) TAXRATE = FUNDS/ 21 A.
and
(7) REEXP. = B • TAXRATE = REEXP for all i = 1 ,2,3,. .
.
,351
We see from equation (6) that the uniform local school tax rate is deter-
mined at a unique rate, given a specific amount of total funds appropriated.
4. Discussion of the Results of the Simulation and Analytical Modeling
We will first discuss the results of the model testing and manipu-
lation. Then we will introduce some issues that need to be addressed, and
that are plausible to attack within the general framework of the model.
However, the further we go, the more we are getting away form the simplicity
of our model and the closer to the real world. The discussion will lead
us to a statement of what we think the issues are that have to be approach-
ed before coming up with a diagnosis of and a cure for the financing and
equality problems facing the educational system.
When discussing the concrete results of our simulation and analy-
tical treatment of the school financing model, we must necessarily restrict
ourselves primarily to the discussion of the results in terms of a poten-
tial equalization objective. For an analysis of actual expenditure equali-
zation
, we are totally dependent on an accurate model of local decision
making with respect to school financing. This is a problem we will expand
on later. Let us first see how the existing NESDEC formula system and

•34-
current proposals fare with respect to equal potential.
The most important result of the study in terms of potential
equalization is that we show that general potential equalization is a
completely theoretical concept in a formula based approach to state
equalization aid. When the formula approach is bound to the real world
by a specific funding decision, only then will there exist potential
equalization at a unique, specific and uniform (by definition of equal
potential) local school tax rate. For example, the decision of the legis-
lature to fund Chapter 70 at a level of A dollars is, in terms of potential
equalization, identical to the legislature deciding that full equaliza-
tion will only arise if all school districts decide to have a school tax
rate of B dollars. Ironically, funding the formula is equivalent to deciding
what the school districts should spend per pupil.
We have also shown that even at the unique school tax rate, all
current formula based systems do not fully equalize. This is due to two
major causes:
1. The constraints in the formula on the -Praction to be reimbursed.
2. The uses of both the total school population and the public
school population, instead of the latter exclusively. This
leads to distortions due to variations in the ration of the
two figures.
Of the two causes for nonequalization, the first is dominant. This is shown
by the fact that a change in the formula to remedy the second cause has
only a small effect on the measure of dispersion in reimbursable expendi-
tures per public school attending child.
The two current proposals for new formula parameters both incor-
porate a change in the constraints mentioned above. In this sense the
proposals can be said to be better than the existing NESDEC formula system.
However, our results also clearly show that the change in the size

-35-
of the average percentage of school reimbursable expenditures that the
state will support has no effect on the equalization properties of the for-
mulas. Our analysis of the effects of underfunding indicate that one
might obtain quite the opposite effect of equalization. An increase in the
average coverage in the formula might increase the chances of the formula
being underfunded. Our results show that underfunding has a disequali-
zing effect on the distribution of state aid funds.
Let us now focus on equalization in terms of actual expenditures.
With this shift of emphasis, we start to expose the insufficiencies of
our present model, and thereby set the stage for recommendations for
further work.
In order to predict future actual expenditure patterns, it is neces-
sary to predict the decisions of the local decision making units - the school
committees. In our model we assumed a uniform behavior for school districts,
such as e.g., "all school districts continue with the same local school tax
rate throughout the prediction period". In terms of the existing and current
proposals for new systems, our results indicate no substantial shift in
equalization of expenditures. The model does show that the implicit equal-
ization effect of the formulas will, under certain behavioral assumptions
take some periods to manifest itself fully.
5. Objectives and Directions for Future Work
The Serano and subsequent court decisions seem to give a clear
indication of what the objective of an equalization program should be. The
decisions emphasize the rights of the child, rather than the prerogatives
of any arbitrary governemntal unit. Governmental units have the responsi-
bility to guarantee the rights of the child. Therefore, equalization of
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potential expenditures (as has been emphasized thus far in the formula
approach) is far less important than a greater equalization of actual
expenditures.
It follows that attention must be focused on financial decision
making at the local level. Any new proposal must consider the issue of
local versus central control. Furthermore, it will be important to deter-
mine the impact of local control not only on financing but, insofar as
possible, on other issues such as the quality of education.
The conclusion of the study is that new alternatives for achieving
equalization should be created and analyzed. Equalization is a complex
problem involving a number of interrelated issues that must be considered.
Important financial issues are:
1. The method of raising funds.
2. The method of distributing funds.
3. The ability of the school districts to absorb additional funds
effectively.
4. The dynamics of the school population and tax base.
5. Changes in educational costs.
6. The burden of other municipal services.
These questions become involved with organizational issues such as:
1. The size of school districts.
2. The balance of control between state and local district and
within the district.
3. School desegregation.
The M.I.T. team feels that a computer-assisted modeling approach
using an appropriate Massachusetts data base can make a significant con-
tribution to the analysis of exisitng and new alternatives for achieving
equalization.
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Once a state aid program has been decided upon, models developed
in the analysis phase could be used by the appropriate decision makers to
track the actual development of expenditures and other variables of
interest. Based upon such other information, one could determine if the
program is meeting its objectives. If not, a change of program, program
implementation, and/or model would be required. The result of such a
continuous effort would hopefully be a fundamentally better understanding
of the situation and problem one is seeking to govern.

- 37 A
APPENDIX A - Comments to report by Mrs. Charlotte Ryan
110 Bridge St,
Manchester, Mass, 01944
June 19, 1972
Mr. Charles B. Stabell
c/o Professor John Little
53-350
Massachusetts Institute of Technology-
Cambridge, I'iass, 02138
Dear Charles:
I appreciate having a copy of your report, as 1 have also appreciated the nelp of
your model in working out some of my own qaestioi.s in this business. Let me say
that you and your colleagues have developed an admirable tool.
You ask for comments. What you have done is wholly intelligible, despite my fear;
also it is significant, and likely to have influence. Thus I have read with care.
It will not be surprising to you that we have differences in views, but as I read
it occurred to me that there are questions of interpretation here that may never
have been spelled out clearly,
1) The paper seems to be based throughout on the premise that equalization means
equalized expenditure. Even though on page 35 you speak of a "shift of emphasis"
to equalized expenditure, you have already on page 1 stated this as your own
objective. Even though also on page 1 you recognize that the NiSDEC formula seeks
to equalize potential expenditure, it seems to me that you have still judged the
various proposals in terms of equalized expenditure throughout the report, I read
both Serrano and Dusartz as requiring state provision for equal fiscal ability in
school districts, also defined as fiscal neutrality on the part of the state; both
specifically deny intent to require equal expenditure,
2) The percentage feature of this formula is not intended as "incentive" to spending,
but rather as giving flexibility to expenditure. It serves the same purpose as
the weighting given to differing costs of educating students of different ages and
course requirements by the National Education Finance Project for use in foundation
programs,
3) So far as I can determine from careful reading, the intent of the 3O/0 proposal
remains obscure. You note that the chief effect seems to be to increase state
funding. This is true, but carries the corollary that the property tax bu_ den
would decrease accordingly, which you have not addressed. The other purpose is to
get as many towns as possible within an equalizing range where state aid can make
up the difference between districts. At present 83 towns - almost a quarter of
the whole number — are protected by the ISj^doinimum and thus outside the equalizing
range; at the AO/o average, 71 towns would be protected by 15/o minimum and 60 at
10;^; at the 50 >o average, all but 46 would be covered at Ib/o, 45 at 10/b, and all
but 32 at zero minimum. Above 50/i> the issue of local control enters the aiscussion.
4) I strongly agree with you that the underfunded formula is disequalizing and several
years running used actual figures to show this in testimony at tne State House. In
the past we have proposed that the legislature change the average coverage figure to
fit available funds, but were told it was too complicated, I could agree that a
higher percentage in the formula might be more subject to underfunding in the present
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situation, but suggest that contemplated changes in the tax structure can be expected
to change the situation. I do not agree that the change in peicentage "does not change
the potential equalization properties of the program" (page 25j as indicated above.
I note that you have based the bulk of your paper on work done in response to certain
requests I made of you early on, although you do not credit them. You will recall I
asked you to make the seven-year pi'ojections in order to test the effect of the formula
over time, and gave you some work I did last year on a dozen or so towns which indicated
that expenditures tended to equalize in this manner. Secondly, I asked you to make the
test on a uniform effort simply to remove one variable, not because we intended to rely
upon uniform effort.
One outcome of this was support for dropping the minimum percentage to zero, wnich does
not appear in your paper, and 1 think this would affect your findings, i'or iiistaiice,
the runs you gave me last week bore out others I had from E & D. I think it sigiaificant
that val/NiiM runs give 1975 standard deviations of 158 on ^^/o aid run at I^/o-CT/o, and
184 on 40Jfe aid. Again, the AO/o histogram, even with expenditure controls, show 48 towns
above the mean on val/NM and the ^Qt/o histogram only 26, I suggest this results from
the wider equalizition range I referred to above.
Third, I pointed out the weighting effect of the val/SAC in some work 1 did comparing
another group of towns using both val/SAC and val/WM, and asked that it be tested for
the whole group, which you did in February. "wThat is not mentioned in the report, and
apparently was not made clear, is that the SAC was used as a municipal overburden factor.
It seems obvious that any weighting will distort a formula; the question is, does it
serve a useful purpose? There are three proposals for municipal overburden factors at
the moment •,• the SAC, a nonschool tax factor, and the LV¥'s valuation per capita, it et B
ran the latter two, but on top of the SaC, which was hard to evaluate, cind we have yet
to liok at them separately.
Returning to the notion of testing the various formulas for intent, it seems to me it
should be made clear tnat the 40^ bill does lean to equalizing expenditure by maintenance
of the constraints on reimbursable expenditures, while the 30-/0 bill tries to extend the
equalizing range. It should be recognized that the 40^^ bill contemplated the same dollar
total as the 50/o bill, with the balance in straight municipal aid. Since the intent of
the 50/0 bill is to shift a portion of school funding to state revenues, 1 would propose
that, instead of comparing the two for mean expenditure on the same local tax base, you
run the 50^*6 bill at 75/^ to (Jt^ with corresponding effect xn lowering the property tax
to arrive at average expenditures equivalent to tnose at the ^0-/0 level (can you do this?
you refer to the procedure on page 53 but did not use it) and then note any differences
in equalization of potential expenait\ire due to the differences between use of constraints
on the one hand and extending the equalizing range on the other.
Some other points that concerned me:
1, The membership weighting you refer to on page 16 is not specified and would be
interesting to know,
2, If you wish to test the past effectiveness of the formula, despite its underl'undmg,
on real-world expenditures, it would be important to add categorical progi'ams which are
significant in some cases,
3o I have trouble with the notion that the level of state aid is a legislative decision
about the level of local expenditure. This might be so in a situation of full state
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funding, but it is hard to accept in a state where local costs are state-fimded at
less than 30 percent while they are increased by minimum-salary legislation, mandated
kindergarten, and other legislated programs, on the expectation that the pro^ierty tax
will bear the increased burden. Indeed, the prospect of that sort of legislative
decision-making is oiie reason why full state funding has .little support here.
4o A third cause bears even more heavily on equalization with all versionis of the
formula than the two you have mentioned on page 34. This is the wide variations in
current expenditures from which we start. What seems significant to me is the strong
movement toward equalized, expenditures all these proposals take. What would have
happened at 7 plus x years?
I would agree with the suggestion on page 36 that the HifflDrJC formula supports local
control and is intended to do so. The issues you cite are all pL-rtinent, but I feel
all can be studied in a ^t^DElG framework. At the same time it is essential to note
that real equality of opportunity is not to be attained by equalization of exj.;enditure
alone nor yet by equalization of fiscal potential alone, iilffective use of funds,
diverse approaches for diverse needs, high quality of educational resources, and strong
intent to help children learn, all enter into what you might call the dynamics of
local decision-making, and have as much to do with good education as money. Under
these realities, you may call equal potential a mirage; I propose it is a necessary
base for equity in funding the differing expenditures that enter into providing equal
opportunity.
Thank you for letting me discuss these matters with you.
Sincerely yours,
Mrs, tidward F. Hysai
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APPENDIX B - EXPRESS SIMULATION MODEL AND COMPUTER PROGRAM LISTING
rE AID TO EDiJCATICfi MODEL
/ELOPED RY (IN ^LPHAL'tTICAL OPDER) :
jROCHCW, A fiAAN, C STABELL
NOVEFinER IB, 1971
CITLE MODEL LEVEL 1?C0
IflTE AID TO EDUCATION
sub level 100
rown subscript smin 1 smax 352 svn tnamei
fear s0!3sci?ip smin 1 smax 15 svn yename
(jcimthv suesckip skin 1 smax 352
data.bas level 130
:hn data input //
dAc integer <town,year>
jhber of school attending children
!jam ihtegeh <town,year>
st average membefsilld in public schools
3qpval real <town,yeap.>
dualized prcperty value
^eexp real <tcwn,year>
eimbuksable school expencitubes
5taid real <town,yeap>
rate aid eef town fasec cn previous years expenditures
rNAME CHAR <'^OWN>
:WN NAKE
PNAME1 CHAR <TOWN>
:wN sunsRPT name
fRtJAME CHAR <YEAR>
iAI YEAR
DECISION LEVEL ICO
iCISICN VARIABLES//
^TOWN INTEGER
JH3EK CF TChNS TC BE CCNSIEERED:
^YEAK INTEGER
JMBEK OE YEARS TC PE CONSIEEPED
JBERAC REAL
^EER eCUND CN FRACTION CF REEXP:
,EFRAC REAL
:WER 8GUNE CH FRACTION OF REEXP:
JBEXP REAL
'PER BOUND ON EXPENDITURE BASE:
:DEXP REAL
:WEK BOUND ON iJXPENDITUPE BASE:
iVGCCV REAL <YEAF>
SIRED AVERAGE COVERAGE:
JNIRATE BCCLEAN
IDICATE BY REPLYING YES OR NO /IF YOU DESIRE TC RUN THE MODEL WITH -
JIFOen LOCAL SCHCCI TAX RATE FOR THE WHOLE STATE (ANSWER YES)/ -
[F you DESIPC TO RUN UNDER CONDITIONS WITH DirEERENT LOCAL TAX PAILS
5WEH NC)
.
[AXEATE REAL
' YCU HAVE ANSWEREl YES CN THE UNIEATE QUESTION INDICATE HERE TliF -
rORf; TAXHATE CESIRID.
JISPCSE REAL
EHCENTAGL OF STATEAID THAT IS USED TC ALLEVIATE GENEFAL LCCAL TAX -
* IF UNIRATE HAS BEEN ANSWERED YES, SHOULD USE A DISPOSE VALUE OF 0.0
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STATEAIU INPUT PI K ASS ACHU £E1 1 S INSTITUTE OF TECHNCICGY
[STO BOOLEAN
HISTOGRAM CF EXP PR NAM PES IL'LD? AWSW EK YES OB NO
)WEXP HEAL
iEK BOUNDARY CN EX PliNT IPUR E HISTOGRAM
IVEXP REAL
'ENDITORE IlISTOGKAM INTERVAL
:iNTR INTEGER
IBER OF INTERVALS IN EXPENDITR HISTOGRAM
JTYEAR INTEGER
in TO DE SORTED
ITPDT LEVEL 100
UJITS CF KCDEL CAICULATICN
:ASAC REAL <TOWN,yEAR>
ITE AID PER SCHOCI ATTENDING CHILL
'AFRAC REAL <TOWN,YEAR>
ICTICN TO EE PAID BY STATE AID BEFORE APPLYING BOUNDS
'ALSC REAL <TOWN,YEAP>
lALIZED PFCPERTY VALUE PER SAC
:PSAC REAL <TOWN,YEAE>
HEUSABLE EXPENDITURE PER NAM
:PHIST0 INTEGER <N OINTP V, YEAR>
'ENDITURE PR NAM HISTOGRAM
:PMAN REAL <YEAR>
iN EXPENDITURE PER NAM
;PVAF, REAL <YEAH>
NDARD DEVIATION OF EXPENDITURE PER NAM
;DSUM REAL <YEAR>
AL SCHCCL AID FtCH STATE
;HTAX REAL <TOWN,YEAR>
:AL SCHCCL PROPERTY TAX RATE
iXMEAN RE?L <YEAR>
iN LCCAL TAX RATE
iXSTD REAL <YEAR>
,nd.'\ed ceviaticn cf lccal tax rate
:exfi <nointrv,yeap.>
alsci <ncintrv, yfar>
'asac1 <n01ntrv, y£ar>
ia^1e2 <ncintrv>
it. end level icc
:L GC FRCC NAME STAID
IRT PROC NAME SORTING
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STAin roilTEAN PI f ASSACHUSETTS tNSTITUTE OF Tr.Crl NC LC'S Y
SUBROn
KEAL*P
REAL*f!
REAL*rt
REAL*B
REAL*R
REAL"^P
HEAL*
8
PEAL*8
REAL*8
R E A L* 8
DIMENS
REAL*8
REAL*
3
HEAL*8
KEAL*8
REAL*8
HEAL*8
REAL*8
CALL E
CALL E
CALL F
NTCWN=
NYEAP=
NTOP=I
NAMS=0
SACS=G
EQPVLS
IHISTO
DC 55
DO 55
CALL L
CO N T I
N
DC 7 I
DO 7 L
J=1
SEQPVL
S N A K = V
SSAC=V
J=L
CALL P
CALL r
CALL F
CONTIN
DO 1
J=1
NAMS=N
SACS=S
EgPVLS
DO 1 J
PVALSC
CALL E
CONTIN
TINI 5TALD
NCINTB/'NCINTRV '/
YES/' YESV
SCT A X 1 / • SCFl TA X • / »R K i^I EF/ ' D I S POSE • / / U NI r R M/ ' iJ N I P AT E ' /
TAXKEN/'TAXKEAN VfTAXVAH/' TAXSTCV/TAXRTE/* TAXRATEV
AIDSP11/«AIDS[]HV#25^PWV'EXPMANVrKXPVl/«EXFVARV
LOW/'LOWEXPV#INTEK/'INVEXP'/fiTOP/«NCINTF'/
EXPUST/' EXPFirSTCV
STFKCl/'STArRAC'/
STASC 1/' SI A SAC'/
TCWNI/'TCWN'/r EQfVLI/' E jPVALV/OYEArn/' NYEAi' •/
ION LCLEXP (355)
0TCWN1/' NTOWN V/RT^^J^PV RPEXP' /^N^MV NAK'/
EXFSC1/' EXPSACV
SAC 1/'SACV»PVLSC1/' PVALSCV/AVGCVI/' AVGCCV'/
STAIDI/'STAIDV
UBFRCI/' UBFRAC'/fLBFfcC VLBFRAC'/
'JPEXP/' UBFXP'/rLBFXP/' L13EXPV
YEAR/' YEAR '//TOWN/' TCHNV
QU (YEAR ,J)
gU (NOINTR^KH)
QU (TOWN ,1)
IV (CT0WN1)
TV (OYEAR 1)
V (ITOP)
=
=
J=1,NYEAF
K!I=1,NT0P
UTIV (EXPHST,IH1STC)
UE
=1 , NTOWN
=1, NYEAR
= V (EgPVLl)
( N A M 1
)
(SAC1)
UTV (EQPVL1 , SEQPVL)
UTV (NAM1 ,SNAH)
UTV(SAC1,S£AC)
UE
1= 1,NT0hN
AMS + IV (NAM 1)
ACSfV (SAC1)
= E(.EVL5*V (EgPVLI)
= 1
,
NYEAR
= V (EQPVLI) /IV (NAM1)
UTV (PVLSC1 ,LVAISC)
HE
COl^^PUTAIION OF CONSTANT LOCAL EFFCHI
STAC<:>110
ST AC '''0 20
STACf'C JO
ST A''O.J!r)
STAC'^OrSO
ST AC CO 7
STA^^C'iC
STACC:90
STACOIOC
STACC1 10
STACC 12!^
STA'j;.:1 1"
STAf n ur
STAT C Ib^'
STA'jOlbO
STaOC170
ST AGO 190
STACC19C
STA302G0
sta:c21c
STACC2 2C
STAC 02 30
ST AC '12 UO
STAC025f.
STACC 200
STACC27
sta:c2'''0
STACl 29*^
STAC'jJ'JO
STAC03 10
ST A 'I. 3 2':
S'l^ACC i '30
STALC i'V)
STAOC -^50
STAG0 3O0
STACC 170
ST AC J 3 80
STAOC 390
STAC 04 Of'
STAC04 10
STAOC U 20
STAOCl 3"'
S T A f" L U U
STAiruO'j
'^TACCUOO
ST A ''C 4 "7
STAOCUHC
STACL4'^0
STAC 05 00
STAC05 10
STAOC 520
STA00 5 30
STAOOOuO
STACC, 00
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STAID FOP TRAM PI MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TLCHNCLCSY
CAIl. PIJTV (EXl'VI ,EXPVi:)
taxmn = t;i xsum/ntown
call rutv (taxken,tax?1n)
TAXVl^^SgRT ( (TAXSC/NTCWN) -T AX»1N**2)
CALL P(JTV(TAXVAR , TA XVR)
LDCflNH FOR EACH TOWN TO COMPUTE 3TA' ;aid
avg;jx
LOWKE
UPPKR
DC 3?
STAFR
IF (ST
IF (ST
IF (ST
GO TO
ACTFR
CALL
IF (V
C) ) GG
IF (V
GO TO
CCNII
IF (V
GG TO
RXP=V
STAID
A I D S U
CALL
5TASA
J=J*1
CALL
J = J-1
CALL
CCNTI
CO NT I
END
p = n F
E = V (
E=V(
1=1
C=1.
AFP.C
AFRC
AFRC
2 2
C = ST
FUTV
(EEL
TC
(R F 5
21
NUF
(RLE
2?
(BEF
= RXP
M=AI
PUTV
C=3T
EXPS/NAMS
LBEXP) *AVGEXP
UDEXP) *AVGEXP
, NTOWN
-V (AVGCV1) * (V (PVLSC 1) / ( Eg PVLS/N A!^ S ) )
.LE. V (UEFRC 1) .AMD. STAFHC .GE. V(LBFRC 1) ) GC TO
. LT.
V
(LBFEC1) ) ACTFRC=V(IBreC1)
. GT. V (HPFRCI) ) ACTFRC = V (UDFP.C1 )
21
A FKC
(STFHCI ,STAFPC)
XP1) .LE.(UPPERE*V(NAM1)) .AND.V(REEXFI) .GE. (L0WEFE*V(NM11)
23
XP1) . L'^. (LOWE RE*V (NAM 1) ) ) RXP =L0WERE*V (NA:^ 1)
XP1) .GT. (UPPERF*V(NAK1) ) ) RXP=UPPERF*V ( tv A M 1
)
XP1)
ACTFRC
DSUM+ST AID
(AIDSM
1
,AIDSUM)
AID/V (SACI)
PUTV(STAin 1, STAID)
PUTV (STASC1 ,STASAC)
NUE
HUE
STAC

COV)
MAN)
7AR)
HEAN)
STD)
SUM)
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-APPENDIX C - SIMULATION COMPUTER RUN OUTPUT
RUN # 1
DESIRED AVEPAGE COVERAGE:
1971 1972 1973
0.65 n.65 0.65
MEAN FXPENDITURE PR NAM
1«71 1972 1973
7R7.269 qao.947 ICB.ia
STANDARD DEVIATION OF EXPENDITURE PER NAM
1971 1972 1973
lU'i.QSU ia6.121 156.346 16U.2^U
F'EAN LOCAL TAX RATE
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1^76 1977
2.U'^37U 2.ao37U 2.40374 2.4n37H 2.40374 2.4r.374 2.40374
STAMDARD DEVIATION OF LOCAL TAX RATE
1971 1972 1973 1974 ig'T? 1976 1977
0.732^^52 0.732952 0.732952 0.732952 0.732952 n. 732952 ^.732952
TOTAL SCHOOL AID FROM STATE
1971 1972 1^73 1974 1975 1976 1977
332.4f5M 406.186M 440. 299n 455.958fl 463.177m 466.''36M 46B.603M
1974
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RUN # 2
:CV) DE5IPED AVEPAGE COVERAGE:
1971 1972 19''3
^.65 0.65 '^ . 65
IAN) MFAN EXPENDITDPE PE NAM
1971 1972 1973
787.269 P15.533 961.675
'AR) STANDARD DEVIATION OF EXPENDITURE PER NAM
1971 1972 1973
149.«5S4 224.027 224.45
1EAN) MEAN LOCAL TAT RATE
1071 1972 1973
2.40374 2.249R3 2.24983
5TD) STANDARD DEVIATION CF LOCAL TAX RATF
1071 1972 1973 1974 1975 1^76 1977
^.732951 0.023478 0.023478 0.023478 0.023478 0.023478 0.C23478
5UM) TOTAL SC^TOOI AID FROf? STATE
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
332.465K 384. 45M 4C7.72aM 4 18.84111 423.874M U26.266M 427.514M
1IST0) EXPENDITURE PR NAM HISTOGRAM
1P71 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
rpv
1974
^.65

^9lt^
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RUN # 4
iCCV) DESTIiT^D AVEPAGE COVERAGE:
i
1P71 1972 1973 197U 1975 1976 1977
0.65 0.6 0.55 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
(HAN) WEAN EXPENDITURE PP NAM
It
1971 1972 1973 197^ 1975 1976 1977
787.269 937.027 10U2.83 1139.28 1239.88 1295. m 1327.23
'VAR) STANDARD DEVIATION OF EXPENDITURE PER NAM
: 1971 1972 1973 197U ^^15 1976 1977
ia9.95a 158.589 181.32 207.155 232.914 253.15 268.265
CKEAN) MEAN LOCAL TAX RATE
^ 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1^76 1977
2.40374 2.40374 2.40374 2.40374 2,40374 2.40374 2.40374
(STD) STANDARD DEVIATION OF LOCAL TAX RATE
^ 1971 1972 1973 1974 1Q75 1"76 1977
0.732954 0.732954 0.732954 0.732954 0.732954 ^.732954 0.732954
)Sn«) TOTAL SCHOOL AID FROrf STATE
I 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
328. •^48M 447.251M 555.925H 669.264P1 731.532M 767. 75W 789.587ri
>HISTO) EXPENDITURE PR NAM HISTOGRAM
{ 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
ITRV
2
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RUN # 5
}C07) DESIRFn AVEPAGE COVERRGE:
:? 1971 1972 197? 197a 1975 1976 1977
0.65 <^.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
'MAN) MEAN EXPENDITHRE PR NAM
R 1971 1972 1973 197a ^^1S 1976 1977
7R7.769 93a. 701 1033.6a 1^81.27 110a.l2 1115.22 112'^. 95
'VAR) STANDARD DEVIATION OF EXPENDITURE PER NAM
I 1971 1972 1973 197a 1975 1976 1977
ia9.95a ia3.ia 155.232 167.096 173.856 177.361 179.23a
(MEAN) MEAN LOCAL TAX RATE
\ 1971 1972 1973 197a 1975 1^76 1977
2.ao37a 2.ao37a 2.an37a 2.ao37a 2.ao37a 2.ao37a 2.ao37a
(STO) STANDAPn DEVIATION OF LOCAL TAX RATE
? 1Q71 1^72 1973 197a 1975 1976 1977
'^. 73795a ^. 73295a 0.73295a 0. 73295a 0.73295a 0.73295a 0.73295a
)SUM) TOTAL SCHOOL AID FROf^ STATE
? 1971 1972 1973 197a 1975 1^76 1977
325.a27M a36.R9aK a9^.57M 516.307M 528. 81M 535. 27H 538.715M
'HISTO) FXPENDTTtlRE PR NAM HISTOGRAW
X 1971 1972 1973 197a 1975 1976 1977
ITRV
2
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RUN # 6
COV) DESIFED AVEPAGE COVERAGE:
1971 1972 1973
1.65 0.6 0.6
MAN) MEAN EXPENDITURE PP NAM
1971 1972 1973
787.26'> 90°. 287 9P7.747
VAR) STANDARD DEVIATION OF EXPENDITURE PER NAM
1971 1072 1973
149. Q53 216.006 210.347
MEAN) MEAN LOCAL TAX RATE
1071 1972 1973
2.40374 2.24983 2.24983
STD) STANDARD DEVIATION OF LOCAL TAX RATE
1971 1972 1973 1974 1Q75 1976 1977
0.732954 0.023478 C. 023478 0.023478 0.023478 C. 023478 ^.023478
SUM) TOTAL SCHOOL AID FROH STATE
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
325.427M 413.R24M 455.161M 475. 26M 484.752H 489.651M 492. 31M
HISTO) EXPENDITURE PR NAM HISTOGRAM
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
TRV
1974
0.6
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RUN # 7
•MAN) MEAN RXPENDITOBE PP NAM
1 1071 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
787.269 917. 05U ^60.038 980.125 989.314 993.967 996.423
VAR) STANDARD DEVIATION OF EXPENDITURE PER NAM
[
19-71 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
149.954 217.597 210.563 206.381 204.381 203.396 202.891
;nEAN) MEAN LOCAL TAX RATE
! 1971 1972 1973 1074 1975 1976 1977
2.40374 2.24983 2.24983 2.24983 2.24983 2.24983 2.24983
;STD) STANDARD DEVIATION OF LOCAL TAX RATE
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
0.732952 0.023478 0.023478 0.023478 0.023478 0.023478 0.023478
SUM) TOTAL SCHOOL RID FROM STATE
I 1971 1972 1973 1974 1P75 ^^^b 1^77
334.177M 383. 62H 405.235M 415. 59M 42C.832n 423.599f1 425.106M
HISTO) EXPENDITURE PS NAM HISTOGRAM
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1Q76 19^7
TRV
2
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RUN # 8
;CPV) DESTHTD AVERAGE COVERAGE:
i ^97^ 1P72 1971 197U 197S 1976 1^77
^^65 0.6 C.6 0.6 0.6 '^.6 C.6
>MAK) WEAN EXPENDITURE PR NAM
! 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 19-76 1977
7R7.769 911.553 989.17 1^25.05 ^f'^2.H 1052.06 1057.^7
>VAR) STAND/JU) DEVIATION OF EXPENDITURE PER NAM
; 1971 1972 1973 197U 1975 1976 1977
149. "Sa 20Q.229 195. 51R 1P8.242 184.513 182.603 181.629
[MEAN) MEAN LOCAL TAX PATE
{ 1^571 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
2.40374 2.24983 2.24983 2.249R3 2.24983 2.24983 2.249B3
:STD) STANDARD DEVIATION OF LOCAL ^'AX RATE
t 1971 1972 1973 1974 19''5 1<'76 1977
0.732951 0.023478 0.023478 ^i. 023478 0.023478 ':^. 023478 0.023478
)SUM) TOTAL SCHOOL AID FPOtr STATE
1971 1972 1973 1974 197S ^^lf> 1977
327.979M 415.42QM 455.857M 475.859f1 4R6.286M 491.Q35M 4Q5.089M
'HISTO) EXPENDITURE PR NAM HISTOGRAM
t 1971 1Q72 1973 1974 1975 1^76 1977
fTRV
2
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RUN # 9
;COV) DESTf?RD AVERAGE COVERAGE:
? 1971 1972 1973
0.65 0.6 C.S5
'MAN) MEAN EXPEMDITMRE PP NAM
t
1071 1972 1073
787.269 013.925 901.875
'VAR) STANDARD DEVIATION OF EXPENDITURE PER NAM
? 1971 1072 1973
1(49.954 216.58 215.60
[MEAN) MEAN LOCAL TAX PATE
I 1971 1972 1973 197(4 1975 1976 1077
2.U037a 2.24983 2.2(4983 2.2(4983 2.2U983 2.2(4983 2.2(4983
[STD) STANDARD DEVIATION OF LOCAL TAX RATE
? 1971 1072 1073 197a 1975 1076 1977
:>.73295(» 0.^^23(478 0.023U78 0.023478 0.0?1478 ^.023(478 n. 023478
)SnM) TOTAL SCHOOL AID FFOP STATE
! 1971 1972 1973 1074 1075 1076 1977
330. 65M 418.478M 504.354M 598. 33M 648.382M 676.505H 692. 9M
1974
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APPENDIX D
An Analytical Analysis of NESDEC and Similar Formulas
The analysis assumes that there are no limits imposed on the
general NESDEC formula of type
EQPVAL./ SAC.
1. STAFRAC. = [1 -AVGCOV
^ EQPVAL, /g SAC ^
i ^ i ^
where (using notation in EXPRESS model)
STAFRAC. = fraction of reimbursable expenditures that state
will cover for school district i
AVGCOV = coefficient determining the average amount of total
reimbursable expenditures that the state will cover
with this average amount being equal to (1 - AVGCOV)
EQPVAL. = equalized property value in school district i
SAC. = number of school attending children in school dis-
trict i.
X EQPVAL. /£ SAC. = average for the state of the equalized property value
i i per school attending child
In addition, if we define the following variables,
REEXP. = total reimbursable expenditures for district i
NAM. = net average membership for district i
TAXRATE. = school tax rate on local, equalized property value
in district i
we have at an equilibrium position (defined as when a school district
is receiving exactly the amount of stateaid to its education that is is
entitled to by the formula and by its local effort in terms of local funds
raised through the school tax rate) that
2. REEXP^. [ 1 - STAFRAC] = EQPVAL. • TAXRATE^.
substituting the value of STAFRAC^. from 1 into 2 we obtain:
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EQPVAL./SAC.
REEXP. [ 1 - (1 - AVGCOV ' ^ ^ ) ] = EQPVAL. • TAXRATE.
Seqpval/ sac ^ ^
which gives
EQPVAL. /SAC.
3. REEXP. • AVGCOV * — = EQPVAL. ' TAXRATE.
2 EQPVAL/ 1 SAC ^ ^
we see that as suggested by the proponents of the NESDEC formula, the
total expenditure is not a function of local property value, EQPVAL.,
but a function of local effort in terms of the school tax rate, TAXRATE.,
as EQPVAL^. is eliminated on both sides of the equation 3 giving
REEXP. = TAXRATE.
^^AVGCOV^^^^ * ^^^i
However, we see that the total reimbursable expenditures is also a function
of the number of school attending children, SAC. By dividing both sides
by the net average membership for the district, NAM., we see that the total
reimbursable expenditure for NAM is both a function of the local tax rate
and the ratio of SAC. to NAM., i.e. the inverse of the proportion of the
school children population in public schools:
REEXP. /NAM. = TAXRATE. I^ EQPVAL/X SAC . ]_
^ ^
''
AVGCOV NAM.
From this result we can draw the following conclusions:
A. In order that a uniform taxrate over the state will give a
uniform, equal expenditure per NAM, it is necessary that the
proportion of children in public schools be constant all over
the state. (Studies show that the ratio has a standard deviation
of approximately 8% around a mean of 78% for the state)
B. The effect of changing the AVGCOV constant in the formula,
keeping all other factors constant except local school tax rate,
will result in a general uniform lowering of the school tax rate
(i.e., the factor AVGCOV in the formula has no leverage on the
equalization effects of the formula, in terms of equal potential
equalization). Its main effect is the general transfer of the
costs of education to the state.
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